1.中国科学院软件研究所可信计算与信息保障实验室,北京 100190
2.中国科学院大学,北京 100049
[ "韩绪仓 男,1987年10月出生于陕西省西安市.现为中国科学院软件研究所博士研究生.研究方向为密码算法侧信道分析与防护. E-mail: xucang2020@iscas.ac.cn" ]
[ "曹伟琼 女,1986年1月出生于广西省桂林市.现为中国科学院软件研究所助理研究员.主要研究方向为公钥算法的侧信道分析与防护. E-mail: caoweiqiong@iscas.ac.cn" ]
[ "陈华 女,1976年10月生于山东省日照市.现为中国科学院软件研究所正高级工程师,博士生导师.研究方向为侧信道分析与防护、密码检测. E-mail: chenhua@iscas.ac.cn" ]
[ "李昊远 男,1995年11月出生于山东省.现为中国科学院软件研究所博士研究生.主要研究方向为密码算法的侧信道分析与防护. E-mail: haoyuan2019@iscas.ac.cn" ]
收稿:2023-08-10,
修回:2024-02-18,
纸质出版:2024-11-25
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韩绪仓, 曹伟琼, 陈华, 等. 一种基于模乘相等检测的标量乘碰撞攻击方法[J]. 电子学报, 2024, 52(11): 3865-3876.
HAN Xu-cang, CAO Wei-qiong, CHEN Hua, et al. A Collision Detection Method Based Similarity Detection of Modular Multiplication on Scalar Multiplication[J]. Acta Electronica Sinica, 2024, 52(11): 3865-3876.
韩绪仓, 曹伟琼, 陈华, 等. 一种基于模乘相等检测的标量乘碰撞攻击方法[J]. 电子学报, 2024, 52(11): 3865-3876. DOI:10.12263/DZXB.20230795
HAN Xu-cang, CAO Wei-qiong, CHEN Hua, et al. A Collision Detection Method Based Similarity Detection of Modular Multiplication on Scalar Multiplication[J]. Acta Electronica Sinica, 2024, 52(11): 3865-3876. DOI:10.12263/DZXB.20230795
碰撞攻击是针对椭圆曲线密码的主要分析技术之一,其关键取决于对点加、倍点碰撞检测的正确率.由于随机操作数和分支语句的影响,对点加、倍点的碰撞检测几近于随机猜测,因而如何对点加、倍点进行碰撞检测成为亟需解决的问题.本文以Weierstrass曲线中基于雅可比坐标的点加、倍点为分析对象,提出了基于模乘相等的标量乘碰撞攻击方法.首先,结合点加和倍点的运算流程,从中识别出了有助于碰撞检测的模乘,并在模乘间构造了新的碰撞关系,将攻击转化为模乘碰撞检测.其次,本文发现在雅可比坐标中存在由坐标
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完全决定的模乘,基于此首次提出了模乘相等检测,将攻击转化为判断模乘两个操作数是否相同,从而避免了随机操作数的影响.最后,本文对一款硬件实现芯片进行碰撞检测实验,通过对曲线基于主成分分析进行压缩处理,将点加和倍点碰撞检测的准确率提高到了99%.本文提出的碰撞检测方法对采用了随机掩码和分支平衡的标量乘实现仍有效.
Collision attack is one of the main analysis techniques for scalar multiplication
and its success rate depends on the correction rate of collision detection in operations such as point addition and multiplication. Due to the influence of random operands and branching statements
collision detection almost approaches random guessing. How to detect collisions for point addition and point doubling effectively has become an urgent problem to be solved. To solve this problem
we focus on point addition and doubling on Jacobian coordinates in Weierstrass curves
and propose a collision detection method for scalar multiplication based on modular similarity detection. Firstly
according to the operation process of point addition and point doubling
the modular multiplication used in collision detection are identified
and a new
collision relationship is constructed between the modular multiplications
which converts attack into modular multiplication collision detection. Secondly
we find that there are modular multiplications which are completely determined by the coordinate
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1.94733346
2.28600001
in the Jacobi coordinates. With the help of this finding
we propose modular similarity detection
and convert attack into detecting whether the two modular multiplication operations are the same
thereby avoiding the influence of random operands on the collision detection. Finally
we conduct collision detection experiments on a hardware-implemented scale multiplication. By compressing the curve based on principal component analysis
the accuracy of collision detection for point addition and doubling is improved to 99%. The proposed collision detection method remains effective for scalar multiplications with masking and branch balancing measures.
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