(2,2)贝叶斯理性秘密共享方案

doi:10.3969/j.issn.0372-2112.2014.12.021

电子学报 ›› 2014, Vol. 42 ›› Issue (12): 2481-2488.DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.0372-2112.2014.12.021

(2,2)贝叶斯理性秘密共享方案

刘海^1,2, 彭长根^1,2, 田有亮^1,2,3, 吕桢^1,2, 刘荣飞^1,2

1. 贵州大学理学院, 贵州贵阳 550025;
2. 贵州大学密码学与数据安全研究所, 贵州贵阳 550025;
3. 中国科学院信息工程研究所信息安全国家重点实验室, 北京 100093

收稿日期:2013-06-18 修回日期:2014-04-02 出版日期:2014-12-25
- 通讯作者:
- 彭长根
- 作者简介:
- 刘海 男,1984年4月出生于贵州省贵阳市.硕士研究生,主要研究方向为密码学与安全协议. E-mail:liuhai4757@163.com
- 基金资助:
- 国家自然科学基金项目 (No.60963023,No.61262073,No.61363068); 贵州省自然科学基金项目 (No.20092113,No.20132112); 贵州大学引进人才科研项目 (No.2012024); 贵州大学研究生创新基金资助项目 (No.2013017,No.2013018)

The (2,2) Bayesian Rational Secret Sharing Scheme

LIU Hai^1,2, PENG Chang-gen^1,2, TIAN You-liang^1,2,3, LÜ Zhen^1,2, LIU Rong-fei^1,2

1. College of Science, Guizhou University, Guiyang, Guizhou550025, China;
2. The Institute of Cryptography and Data Security, Guizhou University, Guiyang, Guizhou550025, China;
3. The State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing100093, China

Received:2013-06-18 Revised:2014-04-02 Online:2014-12-25 Published:2014-12-25
- Supported by:
- National Natural Science Foundation of China (No.60963023, No.61262073, No.61363068); Natural Science Foundation of Guizhou Province, China (No.20092113, No.20132112); Guizhou University Introduction of Talent Research Project (No.2012024); Supported by Postgraduate Innovation Fund of Guizhou University (No.2013017, No.2013018)

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

在理性秘密共享协议中,自利性目标可能会驱使理性参与者偏离协议,从而影响协议的公平性.在(t,n)门限理性秘密共享方案中,其特殊情形(2,2)理性秘密共享方案的公平性较难实现.在同时考虑理性参与者的眼前利益和长远利益的基础上,基于不完全信息动态博弈模型,通过分析理性参与者在(2,2)秘密重构阶段可能采取的策略和信念系统,引入理性参与者的期望收益,研究了(2,2)理性秘密共享重构阶段的完美贝叶斯均衡问题.进一步结合机制设计理论中的VCG(Vickrey-Clarke-Groves)机制,设计激励相容的交互记录机制来约束理性参与者的行为,在不需要秘密分发者保持在线的情形下,提出一个适用于异步通信的公平的(2,2)理性秘密共享方案.

关键词: 理性秘密共享, 不完全信息, 信念系统, 完美贝叶斯均衡, 机制设计

Abstract:

The rational secret sharing is an intersection direction between the traditional secret sharing and game theory.In the rational secret sharing scheme,the selfishness maybe impels rational players to deviate from the protocols so as to influence the fairness of scheme.In the existing threshold rational secret sharing schemes,the fairness of (2,2) rational secret sharing scheme,which is a special case,is hard to be realized,especially implementing on the asynchronous communication channel.To achieve fairness of (2,2) rational secret sharing over the asynchronous communication channel,this paper firstly analyzes rational players' utility by simultaneously discussing their short-term interest and long-term interest.Then through illustrating rational players' available actions and belief systems,and computing their expected utilities with the dynamic games of incomplete information,the perfect Bayesian equilibrium for reconstruction phase of (2,2) rational secret sharing is studied.Furthermore,combining with the VCG(Vickrey-Clarke-Groves)mechanism of design theory,the incentive compatibility mechanism,which is named recording interaction,is designed to restrict the behavior of rational players.Consequently,the fair (2,2) rational secret sharing scheme is presented,which does not need the dealer to keep on-line over the asynchronous communication channel.

Key words: rational secret sharing, incomplete information, belief system, perfect Bayesian equilibrium, mechanism design

中图分类号:

TP309
TN918

. (2,2)贝叶斯理性秘密共享方案[J]. 电子学报, 2014, 42(12): 2481-2488.

. The (2,2) Bayesian Rational Secret Sharing Scheme[J]. Acta Electronica Sinica, 2014, 42(12): 2481-2488.

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(2,2)贝叶斯理性秘密共享方案

The (2,2) Bayesian Rational Secret Sharing Scheme

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