1.中国科学院软件研究所基础软件国家工程研究中心,北京 100190
2.中国科学院大学,北京 100049
[ "岳晓萌 男,1989年12月生,山东青州人.2021年毕业于中国科学院大学,计算机软件与理论博士,主要研究方向为操作系统、计算机架构和系统安全.E-mail: xiaomeng@iscas.ac.cn" ]
[ "杨秋松 男,1977年生,博士,教授、博士生导师. 主要研究方向为操作系统、软件工程和系统安全.E-mail: qiusong@iscas.ac.cn" ]
[ "李明树 男,1966年生,博士,教授、博士生导师. 主要研究方向为操作系统、软件工程和分布式系统.E-mail: mingshu@iscas.ac.cn" ]
收稿:2021-02-03,
修回:2021-12-22,
纸质出版:2022-07-25
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岳晓萌,杨秋松,李明树.基于动态分支过滤的SMT执行端口侧信道安全防护[J].电子学报,2022,50(07):1594-1599.
YUE Xiao-meng,YANG Qiu-song,LI Ming-shu.SMT Port Side Channel Attack Defending Method Based on Dynamic Branch Filter[J].ACTA ELECTRONICA SINICA,2022,50(07):1594-1599.
岳晓萌,杨秋松,李明树.基于动态分支过滤的SMT执行端口侧信道安全防护[J].电子学报,2022,50(07):1594-1599. DOI: 10.12263/DZXB.20210210.
YUE Xiao-meng,YANG Qiu-song,LI Ming-shu.SMT Port Side Channel Attack Defending Method Based on Dynamic Branch Filter[J].ACTA ELECTRONICA SINICA,2022,50(07):1594-1599. DOI: 10.12263/DZXB.20210210.
同时多线程(Simultaneous Multi-Threading,SMT)技术是提升线程级并行度的重要微架构优化技术之一,以SMoTherSpectre为代表的利用SMT环境下共享分支预测器和执行端口的时间侧信道攻击表明SMT技术在提升性能的同时也存在显著的安全隐患.基于记录分支预测错误刷新及调整执行端口资源使用策略,提出了一种SMT环境下执行端口时间信道攻击防护方法.该方法实现了分支过滤和动态资源使用策略修改组件,在防护有效性上可以达到关闭SMT技术的防护效果,性能开销仅为关闭SMT技术的22%,硬件开销可控.
Simultaneous multi-threading(SMT) is one of the important micro-architecture optimization technologies to improve thread-level parallelism. The timing channel attack represented by SMoTherSpectre using shared branch predictors and execution ports in SMT environment shows that SMT technology has significant security risks as well as performance improvements. Based on recording branch misprediction refresh and dynamically adjusting the execution port resource utilization strategy
this paper proposes an approach for defending a timing channel attack on execution port in SMT environment. The approach implements a branch filter and a dynamic resource editor. This approach can achieve the same protection effect of turning off SMT technology
and the performance cost is only 22%
meanwhile
the hardware cost is controllable.
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