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1. 信息工程大学三院,河南,郑州,450001
2. 信息保障技术重点实验室,北京,100093
3. 信息工程大学三院,河南,郑州,450001
4. 信息保障技术重点实验室,北京,100093
网络出版:2018-06-25,
纸质出版:2018
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张恒巍, 李涛, 黄世锐. 基于攻防微分博弈的网络安全防御决策方法[J]. 电子学报, 2018,46(6):1428-1435.
Network Defense Decision-Making Method Based on Attack-Defense Differential Game[J]. Acta Electronica Sinica, 2018, 46(6): 1428-1435.
张恒巍, 李涛, 黄世锐. 基于攻防微分博弈的网络安全防御决策方法[J]. 电子学报, 2018,46(6):1428-1435. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.0372-2112.2018.06.023.
Network Defense Decision-Making Method Based on Attack-Defense Differential Game[J]. Acta Electronica Sinica, 2018, 46(6): 1428-1435. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.0372-2112.2018.06.023.
为准确分析快速变化和连续对抗的网络攻防行为,借鉴传染病动力学理论,提出安全状态演化模型分析网络系统安全状态的变化过程.在此基础上,构建攻防微分博弈模型,设计鞍点策略的求解方法,并以此为依据给出最优防御策略选取算法,实现在动态连续攻防过程中的实时最优防御决策.通过仿真实验验证了模型和算法的有效性,并在分析实验数据的基础上提出了针对性的网络防御建议.
To precisely analyze the quick status transformation and continuous confrontation in network
the security status transformation model is formulated to analyze the transformation of network security status
referring to the infectious disease dynamics.Based on the mentioned above
the attack-defense differential game model is formulated in the paper.Then saddle point strategies of the game model are figured out
through which the algorithm of optimal defense strategies selection in the consistent confrontation is given
which could help make optimal defense decision in dynamic and continuous attack-defense confrontation.Finally
the experimental results show model and method proposed in this paper are valid
and some instructive conclusions on network defense are drawn by the experimental analysis.
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